Resilient Openness: Europe's Economic Security Strategy

Kiel Institute for the World Economy

Openness and vulnerability now go hand in hand: the same global integration that lowers costs and spreads innovation also transmits shocks at remarkable speed. According to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Europe should not respond with autarky but with a resilient openness, capable of identifying critical dependencies without abandoning the markets that underpin its prosperity. A reflection presented at the Rencontres Économiques d’Aix-en-Provence.

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Openness as a source of resilience, not weakness

Europe has learned that openness and vulnerability can coexist. The same global integration that lowers costs, spreads technology and supports productivity also transmits shocks with remarkable speed. A pandemic can close factories on one continent and stop production lines on another. A war can turn energy dependence into a macroeconomic emergency. Economic security has therefore moved from the margins to the centre of policy debates. But if the concept becomes a general argument for protectionism or politically convenient industrial policy, Europe risks weakening the economic base it wants to protect.

Europe should not aim for autarky, but for openness that is resilient to disruption. Trade creates exposure, but it also creates resilience when firms can substitute across suppliers, locations and inputs. The relevant policy question is where concentration creates unacceptable risk, where markets can diversify on their own, and where public policy needs to intervene because private incentives do not fully reflect systemic costs. Risk depends on concentration, substitutability, strategic relevance and the probability that supply will be disrupted or weaponised.

Energy is the clearest example. Europe’s dependence on Russian gas before 2022 was not simply a problem of trade. It was a problem of concentrated dependence on a supplier that could weaponise that dependence. The adjustment away from Russian pipeline gas has been costly, but it has also shown that economies can adapt faster than many expected when price signals, infrastructure, policy and private decisions move in the same direction. At the same time, the shift toward liquefied natural gas has created new exposure to global LNG markets and maritime chokepoints. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran in March 2026 made this exposure visible: gas prices in Europe, too, predictably surged quickly, even though Europe is not physically close to the chokepoint.

Identifying critical dependencies without yielding to protectionism

A similar logic applies to global value chains. Calls for reshoring are often politically attractive but economically misleading. Modern production is knowledge-intensive and input-intensive. No single country can efficiently produce every component, machine, chemical, data service or specialised input at competitive quality and scale. Forcing production home can raise costs, reduce competitiveness and slow innovation. A better approach is to identify stress points in open supply chains. Governments should identify critical nodes by evidence: high import concentration, limited short-run substitutability, strategic relevance and large spillovers if supply is interrupted.

The appropriate instrument will differ by case. Sometimes the answer is stockpiling. Sometimes it is joint procurement, recycling, common standards, investment in substitution technologies or trade agreements with reliable partners. Sometimes the best response is simply better information, because firms cannot manage risks they do not see. Europe should prefer resilience-enhancing instruments over protectionist ones. Diversification, inventories, infrastructure, innovation and faster deployment of low-carbon technologies can strengthen security without closing markets.

From weaponised interdependence to an integrated economic security framework

Interdependence can be weaponised. Sanctions, export controls and investment screening are now normal instruments of statecraft, and Europe needs them. Russia’s war against Ukraine has shown that economic instruments can be essential when military responses are either unavailable or undesirable. But these tools must be targeted and credible. Overuse can reduce their effectiveness, encourage circumvention and accelerate fragmentation. Underuse can leave Europe exposed to coercion. The difficult task is to distinguish risk reduction from bloc formation. Most trade with most countries is not a security threat.

Security shocks become macroeconomic very quickly. An energy disruption raises inflation and weakens growth. A critical input shortage reduces output in downstream industries. A sanctions package changes trade flows, prices and firm behaviour. Policymakers therefore need to evaluate measures not only by their direct target, but by their economy-wide effects. Trade policy, industrial policy, energy policy, competition policy and macroeconomic policy are still too often discussed in separate rooms. Europe needs a more integrated framework: a narrow definition of critical dependencies, better data and monitoring, targeted intervention where necessary, and systematic evaluation of costs and benefits.

Europe’s strength lies in being open, rules-based and technologically capable. Its prosperity depends heavily on exports, imported inputs and global demand. A strategy that raises input costs in the name of security can quickly become self-defeating. An overly broad security agenda would also reduce development opportunities for partner countries and make the global system less stable. Europe should reduce excessive dependencies in critical sectors and defend itself against coercion. But it should keep the multilateral system alive where it can. Predictable rules also strengthen security.

Europe will not be able to predict every shock. The next crisis may come through energy markets, a shipping route, a cyberattack, a technology embargo or a military conflict. But Europe can reduce the probability that a shock becomes a lasting economic setback. That requires preparation before the crisis, coordination during it and honesty about trade-offs throughout. Economic security requires more than slogans. It should protect Europe’s economic foundations, not replace them with an expensive version of self-sufficiency.